Nathan Tyree: logic
Since Archimago felt the need to treat my previous post as if it were an argument I have decided to introduce everyone here to the art and science of propositional logic. This is an extended argument which builds upon some of the classic works of philosophy. To deal with this little essay one will need a working knowledge of logic and argument. You may wish to do a bit of research into apologetics and epistemology before attempting to object to any particular premise below.

The following argument will be in the form of a negative claim. It is often (wrongly) stated that one cannot prove a negative. That erroneous belief is a failure in reasoning. In fact, negative claims are easy to prove (in the case that they are true). There are two genera of negative claims: the limited negative and the universal negative.

Limited negative claims are the simplest to deal with. For instance, if one asserts that there are no tigers in their house they can prove this assertion simply by sealing the house and searching everywhere that a tiger could hide. When all possible hiding places for tigers have been exhausted it can be considered proven that no tigers are in that house.

Universal negatives are a bit more tricky. For instance, if one asserts that there are no black swans this will prove difficult to prove. No matter how many places you search, you will be left with a infinite number of places in the universe that a black swan could reside. This problem does not, however, negate the possibility of proving a universal negative.

Some universal negatives are provable by virtue of their impossibility. A thing that lacks possibility cannot exist. Before we can delve further into this idea we must have a fuller understanding of what it means to say that a thing is possible (or impossible).

There are two types of possibility: physical possibility and logical possibility. For a thing to be physically possible means that no physical law precludes its existence.

Logical possibility is a different matter. Many things can be logically possible without being physically possible. As an example i would offer the cow that jumped over the moon. A cow jumping over the moon is not a physical impossibility. However, it is logically possible for a cow to do just that. Logical possibility is more a matter of internal coherence. To be clear: an internally incoherent concept is a logical impossibility. The normal examples are square circles and married bachelors. It is accepted that a square circle cannot exist as the entire concept is incoherent (see also Russell’s paradox and Berry’s paradox). This may also be called a contradiction in terms (or an oxymoron). By definition a circle is an object of circular shape. Anything that is square cannot be circular. Therefore no square circles exist.

Now that we understand how a universal negative assertion may be proved we can move onto a specific claim. Before we can get more deeply into the argument we will need to define some terms. First: existence. For the purpose of this argument we will be using the term “exist” to mean actually existing in reality as other than a concept or linguistic construct. The other term that needs defining is “god.” We will be using the standard Judeo-Christian-Muslim idea of god. In this tradition god is accepted as a supernatural being possessed of a litany of attributes which include:

Omnipotence
omniscience
omnibenelovence
omnipresence
an unchanging nature
perfection
a wholly incorporeal nature


This list is far from complete, but will suffice for this argument. Now that we have defined god we can look more closely at our definition. Epicurus first noted that omniscience, omnipotence and omnibenevolence cause a problem for believers. The argument (which has become known as “The Problem of Evil”) pointed out that an omniscient god would be aware of all evil, and that an omnipotent god would be capable of stopping evil. An omnibenevolent god would wish that the world be free of evil. And yet, evil exists. This argument is very powerful, and has withstood the test of time. Many objections have been offered against it, but all of them have failed.

I will argue in a similar vein.

I will leave aside the fact that nothing truly incorporeal can truly exist ( remember that we are talking here of actual existence in reality and not of linguistic constructs or portions of what linguists and aficionados of lit crit refer to as “the grand narrative”).

At this point we must ask a question about the nature of god. Can god feel pain? This seems an innocuous (and possibly irrelevant) question. But in truth it leads to an important understanding. So, to restate the question: can god experience physical pain?

There are two possible answers to this question and the both create problems for the believer. If the answer is yes, god can feel pain, then this suggests an inconsistency within the definition (or concept) of god. First, if god can feel pain it would seem that he is not truly incorporeal. Pain is a physical sensation which requires a physical body (a brain, nervous system, nerve receptors). Only physical beings experience pain.

Further, if god can experience pain this suggests that he is not unchanging. If we assume that god is not in a constant state of pain then he must change from a state of not being in pain to a state of being in pain. This makes god mutable. And if god is in fact in a constant state of pain this precludes the ability to feel pleasure. Changing in state from a painless existence to an existence which includes pain must be change for the worse, which would make god less than perfect.

So, lets assume that god cannot feel pain. This means that god is neither omniscient nor perfect. If god cannot feel pain then he does not truly know what pain is (we are speaking here of Qualia, of the physical and emotional knowledge of pain). Further, we mere mortals know what it is to hurt, and yet the ultimate being (as Anselm said: the greatest conceivable being) is ignorant of that knowledge.

Further, god cannot be perfect if he lacks the ability to experience certain things.

So, we see that god (as usually defined) is an internally incoherent concept. That is, portions of the definition of god contradict each other. Internally incoherent concepts are logical impossibilities (as we established earlier). Therefore, god must not exist.

There are many corollary arguments in this line. Think also of the stone so heavy that god cannot lift it. Also ask yourself if God can have an orgasm (see George H. Smith).

CODA:



the argument presented above could be simplified as follows.

1. No logically impossible thing can exist (in reality)
2. Any internally incoherent concept is logically impossible (from the definition of logical possibility)
3. God has the following attributes: An unchanging nature, an incorporeal nature, omniscience, perfection, and omnipotence (by definition).
4. The attributes are necessary to the definition of god (from 3)
5. Any concept containing all of those attributes is internally incoherent.
6. God is an internally incoherent concept (from 3,4 and 5)
7. Therefore god is a logical impossibility and does not exist.














Mood: arumentative
Music: God's Song- Randy Newman


Comments (22)